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IncidentAI infrastructure

Loom for AWS: an unauthenticated client could take over the agent control plane, and MCP scopes could leak OAuth secrets

CriticalAWS

AWS published security bulletin 2026-124 on October 2, 2026 for Loom for AWS, an AWS Labs open-source platform for orchestrating AI agents. CVE-2026-103956 (CVSS 10.0): when no identity provider was configured, the authentication dependency let any network client obtain super-admin authority over the agent control plane, including credential access and IAM policy changes; fixed in 1.6.1 on August 4. CVE-2026-103957: a user holding mcp:write or a2a:write scopes could configure a well-known OAuth2 discovery URL that sent client secrets and access tokens to a server they chose. CVE-2026-103958: outbound connection requests could be aimed at arbitrary internal addresses, including credential endpoints. Both fixed in 1.7.0. Bulletin 2026-125 covers CVE-2026-104019 in SageMaker Unified Studio, where crafted connection data in a Space startup script could run code in another member's Space.

Replay the attack step by step in the Learning Center

How it happened

  1. A deployment without an identity provider answered any network client as an administrator; the control plane that holds every agent's credentials was open.
  2. An integration's OAuth2 discovery address could be set by a user with MCP or agent-to-agent write scopes, so the platform fetched its secrets from, and sent its tokens to, whoever the address named.
  3. Outbound requests made on a user's behalf could reach internal addresses, the same path that exposes temporary cloud credentials.

Impact

Full control of an agent control plane and of the IAM roles behind it, with no exploitation in the wild reported; AWS asks affected customers to assume tokens from the period may have been exposed.

The fix

Upgrade Loom for AWS to 1.7.0, rotate OAuth2 client secrets and reissue access tokens that were active in the affected period, rotate IAM role session credentials if the metadata endpoint may have been reached, and audit CloudTrail; update SageMaker Distribution to a fixed release.

Lessons

  • The control plane that runs agents is an identity system: it needs authentication by default, not only when an identity provider happens to be configured.
  • A discovery URL a user can set is an exfiltration channel; pin where integrations fetch and send secrets.

Sources