Skip to the content
AI and Cybersecurity Learning and Practice Center Test automation Open the Learning Center

IncidentData exposure

Meta Muse: any local app could read the assistant's authentication tokens

HighMetaObjective-See

Days after launch, Patrick Wardle of Objective-See showed that on macOS any local app or terminal command could obtain the authentication tokens that control a user's Muse account, and with them whatever Muse was connected to: email, WhatsApp, calendars and files. One variant redirected the undocumented dictation endpoint to an attacker's server to intercept tokens in transit. Meta said it issued a hotfix.

Replay the attack step by step in the Learning Center

How it happened

  1. Muse stored its tokens where any process running as the user could read them.
  2. An undocumented dictation setting could be pointed at an attacker-controlled server, which then received the tokens.
  3. With the tokens, an attacker had the same reach as the assistant across every connected app.

Impact

A single compromised app on a Mac could take over an assistant that holds the keys to email, messaging and files.

The fix

Meta shipped a hotfix; users should update Muse and review which apps it is connected to.

Lessons

  • An assistant connected to everything concentrates risk: its token is worth more than any single app's.
  • New AI products ship with old-fashioned secret storage mistakes; review before connecting them to mail or messaging.

Sources