IncidentData exposure
Meta Muse: any local app could read the assistant's authentication tokens
HighMetaObjective-See
Days after launch, Patrick Wardle of Objective-See showed that on macOS any local app or terminal command could obtain the authentication tokens that control a user's Muse account, and with them whatever Muse was connected to: email, WhatsApp, calendars and files. One variant redirected the undocumented dictation endpoint to an attacker's server to intercept tokens in transit. Meta said it issued a hotfix.
Replay the attack step by step in the Learning Center
How it happened
- Muse stored its tokens where any process running as the user could read them.
- An undocumented dictation setting could be pointed at an attacker-controlled server, which then received the tokens.
- With the tokens, an attacker had the same reach as the assistant across every connected app.
Impact
A single compromised app on a Mac could take over an assistant that holds the keys to email, messaging and files.
The fix
Meta shipped a hotfix; users should update Muse and review which apps it is connected to.
Lessons
- An assistant connected to everything concentrates risk: its token is worth more than any single app's.
- New AI products ship with old-fashioned secret storage mistakes; review before connecting them to mail or messaging.