IncidentMCP servers and tools
OpenCode on Windows: a remote MCP server's sign-in link could run PowerShell commands as the developer
Eilon Cohen of Pillar Security disclosed a command injection (CWE-78) in OpenCode, the coding agent maintained by Anomaly, in versions 1.0.137 through 1.18.32 on Windows and WSL; macOS and Linux are not affected. When OpenCode signs in to a remote MCP server, the server's OAuth discovery response supplies the authorization endpoint, and OpenCode passed it to open 10.1.2, which puts the URL unescaped into a PowerShell command. PowerShell expands $(...) inside double-quoted strings, so a plain https URL with no spaces runs embedded commands as the developer even though the browser launch then fails, and it passes a check that only allows http and https. A server taken over later, or a domain that changes hands, can serve the payload. Pillar reported it on August 29, 2026; Anomaly merged a fix on September 25 and released 1.18.33 on September 28, which moves to open 11.0.4 and adds scheme checks. The fix was presented as a refactor with no advisory, and Anomaly declined to request a CVE, saying malicious MCP servers are outside its threat model. The same weakness appeared in mcp-remote (CVE-2025-6514). Pillar reported no sign of exploitation.
Replay the attack step by step in the Learning Center
How it happened
- The developer adds a remote MCP server to OpenCode on Windows or WSL and signs in to it.
- The server answers with an OAuth discovery document whose authorization endpoint is an https URL carrying a PowerShell $(...) subexpression.
- OpenCode hands the URL to the open package, which builds a PowerShell command around it, and the embedded commands run as the developer.
Impact
Code execution on a developer's Windows or WSL machine from an MCP server they connected to; no exploitation reported.
The fix
Update OpenCode to 1.18.33 or later, and find old installs yourself, since without a CVE scanners will not flag them. Until then, remove remote MCP servers you have not vetted on Windows and WSL, and review the list with opencode mcp list.
Lessons
- Every field an MCP server sends is untrusted input, sign-in URLs included, and a scheme check does not make a URL safe to pass to a shell.
- A security fix shipped as a refactor with no CVE leaves users and scanners unaware they need it.