IncidentSupply chain
Optimizely: code planted in customers' Project JavaScript put a crypto swapper, a card skimmer and iOS exploit kits on 178 organisations' sites
Scott Helme of Report URI reported on November 16, 2026 that malicious JavaScript was being served to visitors of well-known sites through Optimizely Web, the experimentation snippet that customers load from Optimizely's CDN. The attacker had written a short loader into the Project JavaScript field of many unrelated customers' projects and left the rest of each snippet untouched; Report URI says this was not CDN cache poisoning, because the CDN served exactly what the projects contained. It found the loader in 188 of the 1,611 snippets it checked, belonging to 178 organisations, among them Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Ledger and Optimizely's own sites. The first injection it saw was at 04:21 UTC, the payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day, a card skimmer was added at 13:43 UTC, and a mass clean-up began at about 20:40 UTC, leaving one snippet infected at 21:52 UTC. The payload replaced valid cryptocurrency addresses in page text, form fields, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests; read card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into a site's own fields (cards in a payment provider's frame were out of reach); sent the page address, readable cookies and a screenshot to the attacker when it swapped an address; and, on iPhones and iPads, loaded the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits in a hidden frame. Hudson Rock confirmed links to exploit-kit infrastructure but says successful exploitation has not been shown. Report URI counted about 7,000 dollars in the attacker's wallets by 19:25 UTC and cannot see how many cards or cookies were taken. Optimizely said early on November 17 that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, that it had fixed the flaw and removed the injected code, and it has not said how many customers were affected; Report URI says its own count is probably low. Later on November 17, Salesforce told Reuters it had disabled the altered scripts as a precaution, and Equifax said it had stopped using Optimizely and found no evidence its own systems were compromised. Report URI's list by sector is banking and finance 32, technology 23, retail 20, streaming 12, news and media 10, airlines and travel 9, telecoms 7, crypto and trading 6 and insurance 6.
Replay the attack step by step in the Learning Center
How it happened
- An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely's Experimentation platform (in its account signup flow, according to Optimizely's statement to BleepingComputer as other outlets quote it) and used it to write a short loader into the Project JavaScript of many customers' projects.
- Optimizely's own CDN served each snippet, loader included, on every page of the customer's site, so browsers and scanners saw a file from a trusted domain.
- The loader fetched a payload that swapped crypto addresses, skimmed card details and tried to load iOS exploit kits, and the attacker rebuilt it 26 times during the day.
Impact
Visitors to 178 organisations' sites on November 16 could have had crypto payments redirected, card details typed into the sites' own fields and readable cookies taken, and older iPhones and iPads sent exploit code; Report URI cannot say how many people were affected. The clean-up is not confirmed complete: StepSecurity found the main payload domain on registry hold from 00:37 UTC on November 17 but two attacker hosts still resolving at its last check, and reports that Smartsheet's snippet was re-infected after an earlier clean-up.
The fix
Optimizely says it fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code from affected projects, secured affected accounts and added protections; its status page entry was still marked Monitoring at 07:30 UTC on November 17, per StepSecurity, and its investigation continues. Report URI advises customers to search every Project JavaScript field and each experiment's custom code for 1688360.cc, atob( and any script they did not write; to review users, API tokens and integrations with write access and rotate credentials; to treat cards entered on their own forms and cookies not marked HttpOnly on November 16 as exposed; to set a Content Security Policy that restricts connect-src, avoids unsafe-eval where possible and reports violations; and to consider telling their customers. Visitors should update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, verify crypto addresses before paying and watch card statements.
Lessons
- A script from a trusted vendor runs with your page's full power: treat the place where it is edited as a production deploy path, with strong sign-in, logs and alerts.
- A file served from a trusted domain shows where it came from, not what is in it; restrict where a page can send data and watch what scripts change.
- Keep CSP reports and logs: a clean file today does not show what was served on the day.
Sources
- Report URI: World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely
- SecurityWeek: Optimizely vulnerability exploited to serve malware on major websites
- Hackread: Optimizely hack serves malware through scripts used by 178 organisations
- StepSecurity: OPTIMJACK, Optimizely-hosted scripts loaded a crypto clipper and card skimmer on 178 organizations
- AppleInsider: iPhone, iPad targeted by massive website malware attack