IncidentSupply chain
Shai-Hulud 2.0: npm worm returns and targets CI pipelines
CriticalZapierPostHogPostman
A second, more aggressive wave of the Shai-Hulud worm trojanized about 800 npm packages. It ran before install, spread mainly through CI/CD pipelines and leaked secrets into more than 25,000 GitHub repositories.
Replay the attack step by step in the Learning Center
How it happened
- Trojanized versions were published with stolen npm tokens, and each infection published more.
- A preinstall dropper installed the Bun runtime and launched a large obfuscated payload.
- It harvested GitHub, npm and cloud credentials and posted them to new public GitHub repositories.
- It registered infected machines as self-hosted GitHub Actions runners as a backdoor, and could wipe the home directory if theft failed.
Impact
Mass theft of cloud and CI/CD secrets, with most infections on build runners.
The fix
There is no single patch: pin to versions from before November 21, 2025, clear caches, rotate every credential and audit GitHub for rogue runners.
Lessons
- Run installs in CI with lifecycle scripts disabled and only the secrets that job needs.
- Use ephemeral runners and alert on new self-hosted runner registrations.
- Assume any secret a build can reach can leak, and practice fast rotation.