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IncidentAI infrastructure

Phished Google Cloud admins: attackers linked their own projects to victims' billing accounts and ran up Gemini API bills

HighWizGoogle Cloud

Wiz's Customer Incident Response Team described on October 20, 2026 several intrusions into Google Cloud environments. The attackers bought Google Search ads for admin terms such as "google cloud" and "gcp"; the ad led through a Google Sites redirect to a fake Google sign-in page that captured the password and MFA codes, then sent the user to the real sign-in. They logged in at once from the phishing kit's address and again from a second one minutes later, and afterwards from addresses in the victim's headquarters country. They enabled the Gemini API in existing low-use projects, created service accounts and Gemini API keys, granted roles including roles/ml.admin and roles/mcp.toolUser, deleted the iam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains organization policy, added outside Gmail accounts as billing administrators, demoted the existing billing admins to viewers so they could not detach the rogue projects, and linked projects they controlled to the victim's billing account. Within 24 to 48 hours victims saw Gemini API charges from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars; because the work ran in the attackers' projects, the victims' logs held none of the prompts or outputs. Google Ads removed the campaign after reports. Wiz names no actor.

Replay the attack step by step in the Learning Center

How it happened

  1. Search ads for cloud admin terms led to a sign-in relay that captured passwords and MFA codes.
  2. With the admin account the attackers opened the IAM domain restriction, made outside Gmail accounts billing admins and demoted the real ones.
  3. Projects the attackers owned were linked to the victim's billing account and used for Gemini API workloads.

Impact

Unexpected Gemini API bills of tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars per victim within two days, with no visibility into what was run.

The fix

Phishing-resistant MFA for cloud admins; alerts on suspicious sign-ins, new Gemini API enablement, service account keys, outside accounts in IAM or billing, and changes to allowedPolicyMemberDomains; budgets with spend caps.

Lessons

  • A cloud billing account is a payment method for someone else's AI, and the victim pays without seeing the work.
  • MFA codes typed into a relay page are as good as stolen; only phishing-resistant MFA stops this route.

Sources