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AgentCorruption: one prompt to an AWS AgentCore agent handed over its cloud credentials, and the default role reached every agent in the region

Zenity Labs researchers Tamir Ishay Sharbat and Lana Salameh showed at SecTor 2026 that agents on AWS Bedrock AgentCore could reach the instance metadata service from inside their Firecracker microVMs, so any agent tool that makes HTTP requests could be asked, in one prompt to a public-facing agent, to fetch the agent role's temporary credentials. The default execution role was scoped to every AgentCore resource in the region: with it the researchers could find other agents through log groups, pull their container images, invoke them, read their conversations, plant memories that change their behavior, and read API keys and Secrets Manager secrets. Zenity reported the metadata access on December 25, 2025 and the blast radius on January 12, 2026. AWS says new agents have used IMDSv2 only since February 14, 2026, and by September 29 it had removed the default role's rights to invoke other agents, read conversations and reach Secrets Manager. AWS disputes the research as "expected and documented behavior" and recommends least-privilege roles; Zenity has seen no exploitation in the wild and is checking other cloud platforms.

Why it matters

The 2019 Capital One breach went through the same metadata endpoint. An agent that can make HTTP requests is a request forger by design, so what it can reach is decided by its role: give every agent its own narrow role, and check the default roles a managed platform created for agents you deployed before it changed them.

Sources

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